have been caused by the sound. This post hoc ergo propter hoc offer of proof is also sometimes referred to as false cause, coincidental correlation, or correlation not causation. Post hoc is a particularly tempting error because the intrinsic temporal sequence appears to be integral to causality. The fallacy lies in coming to a conclusion based solely on the order of events, rather than taking into account other factors that might rule out the connection. From a neuroscientific perspective, these audio stimuli are being neurologically routed to the reticular formation (Swann et al., 1982) and simultaneously volume conducted to the cortex, where they can be objectively measured as a series of EEG-evoked potentials (Oster, 1973; Smith, Marsh, & Brown, 1975; Marsh, Brown, & Smith, 1975; Smith et al., 1978; Hink et al., 1980), not brainwave arousal associated with states of consciousness. The traditional neuroscientific community says that changes seen in global brainwave arousal (differentiated from an EEG-evoked potential response discussed above) are functions of the extended reticular-thalamic activation system (ERTAS), which regulates brainwave activity (Newman, 1997). The reticular activating system interprets and reacts to information from internal stimuli, feelings, attitudes, and beliefs as well as external sensory stimuli (i.e., audio input) by regulating arousal states, attentional focus, and levels of awareness (Empson, 1986; Tice & Steinberg, 1989).
SOURCE CONTEXT
TMI Journal 2012 No. 1 · 1 TMI Journal 2012 No. 1.pdf
The selected passage is highlighted. Adjacent passages preserve the surrounding source text.
This well-understood ERTAS mechanism may explain the objective measureable changes in brainwave arousal noted with binaural beats, monaural beats, and isochronic tones, where “entrainment” fails to do so. But the first-person experience of consciousness is much more than just arousal states, attentional focus, and levels of awareness. The cognitive content of the experience gives it meaning to the individual and provides clues to understanding the underlying mechanisms behind such perceptions. Studying the qualitative aspects of altered-state experiences (the cognitive content) over the last three decades led The Monroe Institute to the understanding of further neurological mechanisms involved in those who have deep, meaningful experiences in extraordinary states of consciousness. Such experiences would appear to involve nonlocal (in the “quantum nonlocality” or “quantum coherence” sense) perceptions of reality and the universe. For such perceptions to emerge, consciousness must necessarily extend beyond the physical body. Presumably, the brain organ must be somehow quantum entangled with information beyond the simplex concept of arousal states, attentional focus, and levels of awareness. If mind-consciousness is not confined to the brain organ within the body, why then does science relate states of consciousness and mental functioning to brainwaves? The question can be answered in terms of an instrumentation
exemplar. There is no objective way to measure mind or consciousness with an instrument. Mind-consciousness appears to be a field phenomenon that interfaces with the body and the neurological structures of the brain (Hunt, 1995). This field cannot be measured directly with current instrumentation. On the other hand, the electrical potentials of the body can be measured and easily quantified. Contemporary science likes things that can be measured and quantified. The problem here lies in the oversimplification of the observations. EEG patterns measured on the cortex are the result of electroneurological activity of the brain. But the brain’s electroneurological activity is not mind-consciousness. Therefore, EEG measurements are only an indirect means of assessing the mind-consciousness interface with the neurological structures of the brain. As crude as this may seem, the EEG has been a reliable way for researchers to estimate states of consciousness based on the relative proportions of EEG frequencies. Stated another way, certain EEG patterns have been historically associated with specific states of consciousness. Although not an absolute, it is reasonable to assume, given the current EEG literature, that if a specific EEG pattern emerges it is probably accompanied by a particular state of consciousness. This is completely different from saying that a particular stimulus entrains, drives, or causes changes in EEG (a post hoc ergo propter hoc assertion).