← Library

SOURCE MARKDOWN

(TMI-ARMY Files) 1983 - SEC Army Briefing re CENTER LANE

1983 · Source title

Open original source on Internet Archive ↗

This is existing source text. OCR and automatic-caption errors may remain. Collection notes and project summaries are excluded from this reader.

Recorded provenance: none · Quality: unknown. Use source-scoped search to inspect indexed evidence, or Ask for a cited summary.

1983-09-23 SEC Army Briefing re CENTER LANE (draft).pdf

1983-09-23 · File heading in Markdown

ORIGINAL FILES

Open directly on Internet Archive in a new tab.

Markdown lines 521–808 · Part 1 of 3

--- PAGE 1 (OCR) --- Approved For Release 2003/09/16 j SIP ROP POT ESIOT10p27 YH? pu bo youkd lb Mb S: : On a3 Sed 85 Sec army briefing Introduction Good morning sir, i am ltc buzby, project manager for INSCOM Project CENTER LANE. CENTER LANE is an army special collection Program that utilizes psychoenergetics. The purpose of this Briefing is to provide you with background information Concerning intelligence activities using the CENTER LANE Technique. 1 Will discuss the history of the program, our Missions and organization, examples of completed collection Projects, and our plans for the future. Security indoc (Chart on)..a. History: since 1972, the US government. Including the department of defense, has been involved in Examining potential uses of psychoenergetics. Three specific Aspects of psychic phenomena were of interest: remote viewing (Clairvoyance), psychokinesis and remote pree Felepathy, in the early 1970s serious consideration for Psychoenergetics, primarily in the form of remote viewing as an Intelligence gathering tool, received great impetus from what Can only be described as astounding successes in remote viewing Research by two laser physicists at sri international. Using Several apparently gifted psychic subjects, the scientists Approved For Release 2003/09/16 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 --- PAGE 2 (OCR) --- SG1A SG1A Approved For Release 2003/09/16 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 Conducted a series of CIA-sponsored tests. Much detailed. Accurate information, some of it previously unreported, was Provided about a secret NSA facility, the soviet r&d facility in Semipalitinsk (semi-poly-tinsk), These psychic Impressions were confirmed by humint and national technical Sources. Because of these original tests- the last decade of Work centered on remote viewing, since those original tests, The CIA suspended their active role in psychoenergetic Activities for “political” reasons, but have continued to Maintain a high state of interest in all on-going work because Of obvious defense applications. During the same time frame the Military services and DIA have at one time or another been Involved in numerous psychoenergetics tests, most of them Applications oriented. B. US army interests: the u.s. Army's interest in Psychoenergetics goes back to 1972, when the surgeon general Through the medical intelligence information agency (miia)- Together with DIA, published studies of soviet block work. In 1976, The missile intelligence agency (mia) informally expressed Interest in US replication of claimed soviet experiments in Psychokinesis. Sri developed a small program for them and in August 1977 mia awarded sri an $80k one-year r&d contract. During the same time, another darcom agency, the army material Systems analysis agency was involved in the investigation of Remote viewing concepts with sri. These efforts continued Through fy 1980. In march 1980. William j. Perry. Then Approved For Release 2003/09/16 YCIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 --- PAGE 3 (OCR) --- Approved For Release 2003/09/16 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 Undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, ordered Curtailment of all p6 monies supporting the program, but posed No objection to continuance of non-r&d intelligence applications Efforts. This action eventually caused darcom to cease all ACTIVITY. C. INSCOM involvement: in september 1977, an INSCOM element Implemented the gondola wish program which was designed to Integrate the soviet and east european psychoenergetic Intelligence collection threat into the all-source operations Security (opsec) support scenario. Ktae concept was to train mi Personnel to mimic soviet intelligence collectors. And then Utilize these trained personnel to demonstrate the Psychoenergetic intelligence collection threat, identify Essential elements of information (eefi) exploitable by Psychoenergetic means, determine vulnerabilities, and recommend And develop countermeasures ,p by spring of 1978, sufficient Evidence existed to warrant serious consideration by the army Acsi] for a comprehensive program to explore military Applications of psychoenergetics. The acsi, hen mg thompson, Became the focal point in developing a program within the army, The acsi cancelled the gondola wish effort. Placed a complete Security envelope over army's interest in psychoenergetics, and Implemented a new program directed towards intelligence Collection. The new effort was given the unclassified nickname GRILL FLAME. In october 1978, acsi tasked INSCOM to establish a Program using psychoenergetics for intelligence applications Approved For Release 2003/09/16 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 --- PAGE 4 (OCR) --- omnes Approved For Release 2003/09/16 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 Utilizing -faffsepeed-orpsyghoenergetics-reperred to-as remote Viewing (RV). In response to this cg, INSCOM provided the Following mission statement: (Chart change ) establish a training program in RV utilizing Selected INSCOM personnel. Establish procedures for intelligence collection Techniques utilizing RV. Establish a mechanism for responding to intelligence Collection requirements (tasking) using RV. (Chart change) given this directive the INSCOM GRILL FLAME Project began. By april 1979, INSCOM had awarded a $75k Contract to sri for remote viewing orientation training? By mid 1979 The project was progressing rapidly. INSCOM involvement During 1980 was devoted almost exclusively to operational x wd) Missions. On 13 january 1981, the under secretary of the army © Formalized INSCOM's efforts by approving the continuation of the ke nO OeLeTING wel OTHERE KEM INSCOM GRILL FLAME PROJECT, ee ree da ent oe —feman Action Exper tmentation-n-fhe-prursuet-of-in feel tgence interest s77 and by Dereecfing accother army elements tu cease their activities in Psychuenergetics. As a result, acs] management responsibilities For the army GRILL FLAME effort were transferred to INSCOM. Also in 1981, a joint services GRILL FLAME committee. Consisting Of DIA, the air force and the army, was formed. The navy Expressed no interest in participating in any discussions, and Approved For Release 2003/09/16 :4CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 --- PAGE 5 (OCR) --- Approved For Release 2003/09/16 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 Later the air force chief of staff directed that the air force Withdraw from the committee and all psychoenergetic programs. This joint services effort intended to implement a 3-year Comprehensive program designed to determine the operational Parameters and usefulness of psychoenergetics, and assess the Threat these phenomena posed to national security. The roles of DIA and army were distinct. | DIA issued joint service contracts To accomplish the required external support. Chaired the grill Flame committee, provided progress reports to appropriate high Level decision makers. Additionally, DIA began assessing the Threat, determining countermeasures, and determining the Potential of remote viewing using experienced vers.| DIA's r&d Effort was primarily accomplished through contracts with sri . The army's INSCOM GRILL FLAME project was to use remote viewing As an operational technique to collect intelligence and to Determine if remote viewing could be learned by professional Intelligence personnel who were not “established psychics.” INSCOM participated in this joint services effort for fys 81 and 82, Then the senate select committee on intelligence {senator Wallop)] curtailed all psychoenergetic operational activities Conducted by the army in the national foreign intelligence Program (nfip) at the end of fy 1982, the congressional Conferees agreed, however, to let DIA complete the third year of Their effort and directed that future funding ~~ if any ~~ of This psychoenergetic activity be budgeted outside the nfip. In Keeping with these congressional desires and wishing to maintain The momentum of effort already Approved For Release 2003/09/16 5CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 --- PAGE 6 (OCR) --- LS Approved For Release 2003/09/16 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 Established, cg INSCOM decided to continue INSCOM's project and Provide funding with security and investigative activities (S&ia) monies. INSCOM terminated formal involvement with grill Flame at the end of fy 82, and continued its efforts under a new Program nicknamed CENTER LANE. CENTER LANE exists today as an Approved special access program (sap). Lhe cooperate with DIA, But are separately funded and managed outside the gdip. PART 1 A, operational missions: [Afer—i-—-willbe-showing you some examples —of- spectfte— Over view of INSCOM's operational efforts over the past five Years. (Graph on) during 1979, we conducted 79 operational Missions, 43 of which were dedicated to assisting the Intelligence community during the iranian hostage crisis. During 1980, After we acquired operational experience, our own separate Facilities, and increased manpower, we were able to increase our Production to 386 operational missions, 154 of which were still Dedicated to iran. In 1981, we produced 153 operational Missions with only 6 dedicated to iran hostage requirements. During the last half of 1981, personnel losses resulted in a Sharp decline of operational missions, a situation that Currently exists. During the first nine months of 1983 we have Conducted 47 missions. In summary, in the past five years Approved For Release 2003/09/16 6CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 --- PAGE 7 (OCR) --- Approved For Release 2003/09/16 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 We have conducted 700 operational intelligence collection Missions. A considerable portion of these (over 200) were in Support of the iran situation, which the joint chiefs of staff Rated as being qualitatively equal to those of other Intelligence sources available to them. B. With regard 10 personnel: (Graph change) in 1979, cg INSCOM formed a task force Consisting of 5 personnel: a project manager, an Operations/training officer. A secretary, and two sources (Rvers). In 1980, two additional operational personnel were Assigned. By 1981, we were ready to expand and recruited 2 new Personnel for the project, but by the end of 1981, pcs moves Severely hampered our operational capability. In 1982 and 1983, We remained static in our personnel situation until recently. Qur current full time strength is shown on the graph, ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE TWO PART TIME sources. IN JANUARY 1984, Another individual will be assigned, with an additional asset Scheduled for assignment in may 1984, we have a very active Recruiting/screening program and look forward to growing rapidly And increasing our operational capabilities once we obtain Appropriate personnel spaces and funding. C. TRAINING: Our mission statement requires US to train personnel to perform Approved For Release 2003/09/16 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 --- PAGE 8 (OCR) --- Approved For Release 2003/09/16 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001700270022-2 Remote viewing. I will now provide you with an overview of our Training effort for the past five years. (Graph change) Training actually began in 1979, with our in-house effort to Introduce selected INSCOM personnel to the remote viewing Process. We began with 12 potential trainees from which 6 were Selected for orientation training at sri, hefernahlonal—in €nctreritts DURING 1979, WE INTEGRATED THE SR] ORIENTATION Training technology into our in-house training program where it Is still in use today for new personnel. During the first half Of 1980, little or no formal training was conducted because of Operational commitments and lack of funding. Later in 1980, In-house training became necessary to develop source (rvers) Abilities to respond to operational tasking. By then our Operational commitments extended beyond the capabilities Developed as a result of the sri orientation training. Our In-house training developed from the practical application of